# Introduction to Wilson's Oddness Theorem

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Image: A matrix and a matrix

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Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents.

Essentially, we study a theoretical framework for conceiving social situations among competing players. Game theory can be seen as a science for strategy.

### Definition

The equilibrium points are the situations in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy, having no incentive to deviate from it, after taking into consideration the opponent's strategy



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The Utility function  $U_i$  shows the payoff of a given strategy. Payoff of pure strategy *n*-tuple  $a^m : U_i(a^m) = u_i^m$ Payoff of mixed strategy *n*-tuple  $p(p_1, \ldots, p_n)$ :  $U_i(p) = \sum_{m=1}^{K} [\prod_{i=1}^n q_i^m(p_i)] u_i^m$  A n-tuple S is an equilibrium point if and only if for every i:

$$U_i(S) = \max_{allr'_i s} [U_i(S; r_i)]$$

which by linearity of  $p_i$  gives us:

$$\max_{\alpha}[U_i(S;\pi_{i\alpha})] = \max_{\substack{allr'_is}}[U_i(S;r_i)]$$

. Define  $p_{i\alpha}(S) = p_i(S; \pi_{i\alpha})$ . Then we have S is an equilibrium point if:

$$U_i(S) = \max_{\alpha} U_{i\alpha}(S)$$

*i* indicates a player,  $\alpha$  indicates a pure strategy of a player,  $r_i$  indicates a mixed strategy of *i* and  $\pi_{ia}$  indicates *i*'s  $\alpha^{th}$  pure strategy.

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# Prisoner's Dilemma

Let's look at a famous situation in game theory called the Prisoner's Dilemma.

A situation has two prisoners a and b and the following outcomes below are possible.



### Prisoner B

We use game theory for optimal decision-making of independent and competing actors in a strategic setting. Using game theory, real-world scenarios for such situations as pricing competition and product releases (and many more) can be laid out and their outcomes predicted. It can help assess how efficiently communities make decisions when there is no cooperation between players in a game.

Essentially, game theory allows us to maximise payoff of a situation using equilibrium points, which is usually the aim of game theory.

Wilson's Oddness Theorem states that:

Theorem

In almost all finite games, the number of equilibrium points is finite and odd

We will look at the *almost all* nature of this theorem in the upcoming slides.

For any strategy *n*-tuple  $p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n)$  the carrier of C(p) will be defined as the union of carrier of its component strategies as:

$$C(p) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n C(p_i).$$

Additional Explanation: The carrier of  $p_i$  is the set  $C(p_i)$  of all pure strategies  $a_i^k$  to which the mixed strategy  $p_i$  assigns positive probabilities  $p_i^k > 0$ . If this carrier contains only one pure strategy  $a_i^k$ , then  $a_i^k = p_i$ . However, if  $C(p_i)$  contains all  $K_i$  pure strategies of player *i*, then  $p_i$  will be called a *complete mixed* strategy. And lastly, if  $p_i$  doesn't have only one or all pure strategies, it will be called an *incomplete mixed* strategy.

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# What does a Quasi-Strong Game mean?

A quasi strong game is a game that has *only* quasi-strong equilibrium points.

### Definition

Quasi Strong Equilibrium Point: p is quasi strong if no player i has pure-strategy best replies to  $\overline{p}_i$  other than the pure strategies belonging to carrier  $C(p_i)$  of his equilibrium point  $p_i$ .

The proof for this theorem utilises the proof of three other theorems through which this theorem is implied:

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#### Theorem

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These proofs rely heavily on topological properties of the solution graph T wherein T is the locus of all solutions (t, p) to the simultaneous equations and inequalities.

Let's think about what the 'Almost All' means in Wilson's Oddness Theorem. It's really unusual to have something like this in math.

Suppose we have a dartboard of area 1. A dart that will always land on the dartboard will have a probability of 1 of landing on the entire dartboard. What happens if you pick a region that is a single point, say the origin? As the radius gets smaller and smaller and closer and closer to 0, the area becomes infinitesimally small. The limiting value is when the disk "turns into" a single point, and this will have an area of 0.



# An Exceptional Case

Consider the following game, player x and player y get 1 a piece if they play (Up, Left) and they get nothing otherwise.

As shown on the right, Left-Up is one equilibrium point and Right-Down is one equilibrium point. That gives 2 (an even number) of equilibrium points! In fact, in the Up-Left box, if we change 1 to any positive real number, there will always exist 2 equilibrium points.



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